What this is
What is a robot and automation safety assessment?
What is a robot and automation safety assessment?
It is a structured review of a robotic cell, caged or collaborative, covering perimeter safeguarding, speed and separation monitoring, teach mode and how faults and jams are recovered from. It is a singleton against ISO 45001 cl.6.1.2: one live assessment per cell, reopened on installation and after any programme change rather than raised fresh each time.
What is speed and separation monitoring?
It is a collaborative safety function that slows or stops a robot as a person moves closer, using sensors to maintain a calculated separation distance instead of a fixed physical guard. It only works if the distance is calculated correctly and the sensors cover the whole approach path, so a cell that merely advertises the feature has not demonstrated it.
What is teach mode, and why does it need its own controls?
Teach mode is the manual, low-speed operating state used to programme or reposition a robot's path, normally run with a pendant and an enabling device rather than automatic cycling. It puts a person inside the cell's reach envelope by design, so its speed limit, its enabling device and who is authorised to use it are separate controls from anything that governs normal automatic running.
Scope
When is a robot and automation safety assessment required?
This assessment is one step in the Machine Safety programme. Using it for work that belongs to a neighbouring template leaves the cell's non-routine risks unassessed under the wrong heading.
Use this template when
- A new robotic cell, caged industrial robot, cobot or AGV is being installed
- The cell's programme, tooling, end effector or safeguarding has materially changed
- A periodic review is due, a complaint has been raised, or the assessment follows an incident
- You are running the Machine Safety programme and this cell is one of its steps
- A linked record needs this one to exist, such as a conveyor safety review or an isolation procedure referencing the cell
Do not use it for
- Conveyor and Transfer Safety Review, which reviews an entire conveyor line for nip points, pull cords, crossovers and jam clearing rather than the cell itself.
- Combustible Dust Assessment, which assesses whether dust from flour, powders, sugar or packaging can accumulate and ignite, independent of any robot in the area.
- Guarding Verification Checklist, which confirms that guards already fitted to a machine match its risk assessment, rather than assessing the cell's design from scratch.
- Interlock Function Test, which is a periodic functional test of a specific interlock, not a design-level assessment of the whole cell.
- Anything outside KnowSafe, which belongs in the workspace that owns that process.
Compliance mapping
Which ISO 45001 cl.6.1.2 requirements does this satisfy?
The clause map lines up the assessment's core judgement points against ISO 45001 cl.6.1.2, which requires hazard identification and risk assessment to cover both routine and non-routine activities.
| Clause | Requirement | Where it lands |
|---|---|---|
| cl.6.1.2 hazard identification | Identify hazards from routine and non-routine activities, including how people, plant and behaviour interact | Non routine operation |
| cl.6.1.2 hierarchy of controls | Determine controls following elimination, substitution, engineering, administrative, PPE in that order of preference | Outcome |
| cl.6.1.2 risk assessment methodology | Apply a consistent method to arrive at a residual risk level and a decision on acceptability | Outcome |
| cl.6.1.2 access to hazard | Assess physical safeguarding that prevents or controls exposure to the hazard | Safeguarding |
| cl.6.1.2 people working near automated plant | Assess risk where automation and people share a working envelope, including collaborative operation | Collaborative operation |
| cl.6.1.2 review triggers | Review the assessment when plant, process or programme changes, or after an incident | Header |
| cl.6.1.2 competence of assessors | Ensure the person carrying out the assessment has the competence to do so | Outcome |
| cl.6.1.2 documented information | Retain documented evidence of the assessment and its outcome | Outcome |
What it does not cover
- A manufacturer's datasheet claiming safe force limits, which is a design specification, not a measured verification of the cell as installed.
- An interlocked door left bypassed during commissioning, which defeats the control the assessment is meant to confirm.
- A jam-clearing method staff describe consistently but that appears nowhere in writing, which is an informal practice, not a defined procedure.
- A residual band recorded as low without a stated highest control level, which is an assertion, not a documented judgement.
- A teach-mode pendant running at full speed because the limit was disabled for a one-off fix, which removes the one control specific to non-routine operation.
Global
Robot and Automation Safety Assessment requirements by country
Robot cell safety is shaped less by where the factory sits than by which robot standard it was built to and which regulator inspects the outcome. These three carry the most weight.
Machinery Regulation (EU) 2023/1230, with ISO 10218-1/-2 and ISO/TS 15066 as the technical route to conformity
A robot placed on the EU market must meet essential health and safety requirements; using the harmonised robot standards gives a presumption of conformity
The CE mark is only as good as the risk assessment behind it, especially for collaborative applications where force limits must be measured, not assumed
ANSI/RIA R15.06, referenced by OSHA under the General Duty Clause
OSHA has no robot-specific standard, so it treats the ANSI/RIA suite as recognised industry practice when judging a cell after an incident
The absence of a documented, competently assessed safeguarding and non-routine operation review is treated as a gap against known practice, regardless of which specific rule was breached
Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations 1998 (PUWER)
PUWER puts the duty on the employer to keep work equipment safe throughout its working life, not just as supplied
A UK site cannot rely on the cell's original CE or UKCA marking as ongoing proof of safety; PUWER expects reassessment exactly when programme or tooling changes
How to complete it
How to complete a robot and automation safety assessment, step by step
Four judgement calls decide whether this assessment holds up later, none about how to fill in the form.
Collaborative mode is scored as a risk factor precisely because it invites reliance on the manufacturer's claim. Marking manufacturer claim only records an open question, not a closed one, and the residual band should reflect that.
The non-routine operation section exists because most robot injuries happen there. If the procedures were described rather than watched, the assessment has verified a story, not a control.
The hierarchy of controls field only means something if it reflects a real comparison against elimination and substitution first. Recording the existing control without considering a better one understates the residual risk.
A cell can be well designed and poorly maintained, or the reverse. Conflating the two in one residual band obscures which lever, engineering change or maintenance discipline, actually needs to move.
What auditors find
Most common robot and automation safety assessment findings
Failure patterns that recur across these assessments once they are audited against their own evidence.
| Finding | Clause | What fixes it |
|---|---|---|
| Force and pressure limits recorded as validated on the manufacturer's claim alone | cl.6.1.2 hierarchy of controls | Require a dated, measured verification before the field can be marked validated rather than claimed |
| Interlocked access points scored as all, when one was bypassed for commissioning and never reconnected | cl.6.1.2 access to hazard | Physically walk every access point at the time of assessment rather than scoring from the design drawing |
| Jam clearing procedure marked as defined, with no document reference or review date | cl.6.1.2 documented information | Make the procedure reference required whenever the status is anything other than none |
| Teach mode speed limiting confirmed as yes without checking the pendant's actual configured speed | cl.6.1.2 hazard identification | Have the assessor observe the pendant in teach mode and record the measured speed |
| Residual band recorded as low with no highest control level entered | cl.6.1.2 risk assessment methodology | Block submission of a residual band until the highest control level field is completed |
| Assessment left open for months after a programme change with no next review date moved forward | cl.6.1.2 review triggers | Tie the next review due date to the programme change control field so a change shortens the interval |
Case in point
Case in point: a cobot cell passed on paper twice before the near-miss
A cobot cell beside a packing line was assessed at commissioning and again after a tooling change six months later. Both assessments recorded interlocked access points as all, and speed and separation monitoring as yes. Neither involved anyone standing in the monitored zone while the robot ran; sensor coverage was taken on trust from the integrator's report.
A near-miss followed when an operator reaching in from an angle outside the sensor's field of view was not detected, and the arm did not slow. The gap was in the geometry of coverage, not the presence of the sensor, and it had been invisible in both assessments because neither tested the boundary of the monitored zone, only whether the feature existed.
The template
The template, field by field
The form exactly as it installs. Every field, option, score and conditional rule is editable, and the links to other templates come with it.
6 sections
- Reference
- SAF-173
- Archetype
- Assessment
- Record ID
- RAS-2026-000
- Scoring
- Residual band
- Direction
- Low is good
- Singleton
- Yes
- Basis
- ISO 45001 cl.6.1.2
- Links
- Links Machine safety, Isolation
- Tags
- Manufacturing, Robots
- Sections
- 6
- Fields
- 53
- Follow up fields
- 3
- Repeating sections
- 0
- Links out
- 5
Header
14 fieldsAssessment ID*
Auto sequence. Format RAS-2026-000.
The record's own ID. Other templates point at this value.
Status*
Drives who this goes to next.
- Planned2 pts
- In progress2 pts
- Complete3 pts
- Deferred0 pts
- Open0 pts
- Closed3 pts
- Overdue0 pts
Date and Time*
Completed By*
Site*
Site ID*
Format SITE-000.
Links to FDN-001 Site ID
Area
The area within the site.
Exact Location
Drop a pin for anything hard to find.
Cell Or Robot
Asset ID
Format AST-0000.
Links to FDN-002 Asset ID
Teaching And Jam Clearing
Almost no robot injuries happen during normal automatic operation. They happen when somebody is inside the cell teaching, clearing a jam or recovering from a fault.
Cell Type*
Caged industrial robot, collaborative robot, or automated guided vehicle.
Assessor*
Assessment Trigger*
Safeguarding
9 fieldsPerimeter Guarding Adequate*
- Yes3 pts
- Partly1 pt
- No0 pts
Interlocked Access Points*
- All3 pts
- Some1 pt
- None0 pts
Interlocks Cannot Be Defeated Easily*
- Yes3 pts
- Partly1 pt
- No0 pts
Presence Sensing Where Used
- Yes3 pts
- Partly1 pt
- No0 pts
Nobody Can Be Trapped Inside*
Trapped key or inside release. Somebody inside a cell when it restarts is the classic fatality.
- Confirmed3 pts
- Uncertain1 pt
- No0 pts
Inside Release Fitted*
- Yes3 pts
- No0 pts
Emergency Stops In Reach From Inside*
- Yes3 pts
- Partly1 pt
- No0 pts
Robot Reach Envelope Marked*
- Yes3 pts
- Partly1 pt
- No0 pts
Adjacent Equipment Interlocked
- Yes3 pts
- Not applicable3 pts
- No0 pts
Collaborative operation
5 fieldsCollaborative Mode Used*
- No3 pts
- Yes1 pt
Speed And Separation Monitoring
- Yes3 pts
- No0 pts
Force And Pressure Limits Validated
Collaborative does not mean safe by default. The limits must be measured against body region limits.
- Yes, measured3 pts
- Manufacturer claim only1 pt
- No0 pts
Tooling And Payload Assessed
A safe robot carrying a sharp tool is not a safe cell.
- Yes3 pts
- No0 pts
Sharp Or Hot End Effector
- No3 pts
- Yes0 pts
Non routine operation
9 fieldsTeach Mode Speed Limited*
- Yes3 pts
- No0 pts
Enabling Device Required In Teach Mode*
- Yes3 pts
- No0 pts
Only Trained Persons Can Teach*
- Yes3 pts
- Partly1 pt
- No0 pts
Jam Clearing Procedure Defined*
- Yes3 pts
- Informal1 pt
- No0 pts
Isolation Required For Jam Clearing*
- Yes3 pts
- Sometimes1 pt
- No0 pts
Fault Recovery Procedure Defined*
- Yes3 pts
- Informal1 pt
- None0 pts
Restart Requires Deliberate Action*
- Yes3 pts
- Automatic on door close0 pts
Area Clearance Before Restart*
- Yes3 pts
- Partly1 pt
- No0 pts
Programme Change Control In Place*
- Yes3 pts
- Informal1 pt
- No0 pts
Related records
1 fieldConveyor Safety Review ID
Conveyors feeding or served by this cell.
Links to SAF-174 Review ID
Outcome
15 fieldsHighest Control Level Applied*
- Eliminate4 pts
- Substitute4 pts
- Engineer3 pts
- Separate or isolate3 pts
- Administrative1 pt
- PPE0 pts
Residual Band*
- Low, 1 to 45 pts
- Medium, 5 to 94 pts
- High, 10 to 142 pts
- Very high, 15 to 191 pt
- Extreme, 20 to 250 pts
Risk Acceptable*
- Yes3 pts
- Marginal1 pt
- No0 pts
Further Controls Required
Risk Assessment
Risk ID
Format RSK-2026-00000.
Links to FDN-012 Risk ID
Action Required*
Raise the action record, then enter its reference here.
- No2 pts
- Yes0 pts
Priority
- High0 pts
- Medium1 pt
- Low3 pts
CAPA ID
Format CAPA-2026-00000.
Links to FDN-014 CAPA ID
Action Owner
Next Review Due*
Assessor*
Signature*
Engineering Manager*
Second Signature*
SAF-173 · record IDs look like RAS-2026-000 · Links Machine safety, Isolation
Open in KnowellaRun it with agents
From a document you fill in to a programme that runs itself
The form is easy. Keeping the assessment current after every programme change, and holding teach mode and jam clearing evidence together, is the work that actually slips.
Holds the robot and automation safety assessment against the asset register, flags cells overdue for review after a logged programme change, and keeps the safeguarding evidence trail together.
Surfaces the linked isolation and jam-clearing procedures at the point a fault is logged against the cell, so recovery follows the assessed method instead of an improvised one.
Tracks who is authorised to operate the cell in teach mode against the training record, so an untrained person picking up the pendant is a visible exception, not a silent one.
Coordinates the crew across safety, maintenance and training, rolls the cell's completion and exceptions into one view, and holds every write for your approval before it touches a record.
This template lives in KnowSafe — safety and compliance. Incidents, hazards, permits, inspections and the critical controls behind them.
Meet KnowSafe→Glossary
Robot and Automation Safety Assessment definitions and key terms
- Speed and separation monitoring
- A collaborative safety function that varies robot speed based on measured distance to a person, stopping if the minimum protective separation is breached.
- Enabling device
- A hand-held control, typically three-position, that a person must hold correctly for a robot to move in teach or manual mode; releasing or overpressing it stops the robot.
- Residual risk band
- The risk remaining after controls are applied, expressed as a band from low to extreme, used to judge whether further action is needed before the risk is accepted.
- Highest control level applied
- The most effective control category, from elimination and substitution down to PPE, actually implemented for a hazard, as distinct from what could theoretically apply.
- Trapped-key interlock
- A locking system using a captive key that prevents a guard closing, or the machine restarting, while a person could still be inside the danger zone.
FAQ
Frequently asked questions about robot and automation safety assessment
What is the robot and automation safety assessment template based on?+
It is built against ISO 45001 cl.6.1.2, which requires hazard identification and risk assessment to cover routine and non-routine activities. It also draws on the robot-specific safety standards, ISO 10218 and ISO/TS 15066, for the collaborative and teach-mode fields.
What sections does the assessment contain?+
There are six sections: header, safeguarding, collaborative operation, non routine operation, related records, and outcome. Together they hold 53 fields, 35 of which are required.
How many robot and automation safety assessment records should we have?+
This is a singleton. One live record per cell, set up once at installation and reopened at each material change, not one new record per event.
Which programme does this assessment belong to?+
It is part of Machine Safety: guard integrity verified, interlocks tested, and jam clearing controlled rather than improvised.
How is the assessment scored?+
Scoring produces a residual risk band, where low is good. The band is driven by the highest control level actually applied, not by the presence of a safety feature alone.
Why does collaborative mode lower the score rather than raise it?+
Collaborative mode puts a person inside the robot's working envelope by design, so it is treated as an added risk factor, not a safety feature in its own right. Force and pressure limits must be measured before that risk counts as managed.
Keep going
Related templates and programmes
Industries this is written for
Programmes this belongs to
Used together in Machine Safety
Lockout/Tagout Procedure (Machine Specific)
Sets out exactly how to isolate a specific machine, listing every energy source and isolation point
LOTO Periodic Inspection
Checks that a specific energy control procedure is being followed correctly in practice
Machine Risk Assessment
Assesses a machine across its whole life, including setup, running, cleaning, clearing jams and maintenance
Guarding Verification Checklist
Confirms that guards fitted to a machine match the risk assessment and cannot be easily defeated
Interlock Function Test
Tests that safety interlocks stop the machine when a guard is opened, and cannot be bypassed
Robot Cell Safety Assessment
Assesses an industrial or collaborative robot cell, covering reach, speed, force limits and how people enter the space
More in Manufacturing Safety
Written and reviewed by
Siddarth Singh
Founder & Chief Executive Officer, Knowella
Certified Safety Professional and industrial and systems engineer with more than a decade inside food supply chain, freight and manufacturing operations. This page was written against the current text of the standards it cites, not against secondary summaries of them.
- Certified Safety Professional (CSP), Board of Certified Safety Professionals
- MBA, University of Chicago Booth School of Business
- MS and BS, The Ohio State University, Industrial and Systems Engineering
- Six Sigma Black Belt
Sources and last review. Reviewed 16 August 2026 against:
- ISO 45001:2018 cl.6.1.2 — Hazard identification and assessment of risks and opportunities
- ISO 10218-1:2011 and ISO 10218-2:2011 — Robots and robotic devices, safety requirements for industrial robots
- ISO/TS 15066:2016 — Robots and robotic devices, collaborative robots
- ANSI/RIA R15.06-2012 — Safety requirements for industrial robots and robot systems
- Machinery Regulation (EU) 2023/1230
This page is general guidance, not legal advice. Confirm requirements with your jurisdiction’s regulator.